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OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, C.O. 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
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(D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-00448) 
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September 27, 1999 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Appellant Alan T. Brooks, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, 
brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against four 
prison officials, claiming, among other things, that they 
violated his right under the Eighth Amendment to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment. Brooks has appealed 
the District Court's final order granting summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants. The appeal presents the question 
whether a prisoner who testifies that he was violently 
beaten by three prison guards, but who adduces no 
objective evidence of anything but de minimis injuries, may 
survive a summary judgment motion on his Eighth 
Amendment claim. We conclude that he may, and hence we 
reverse. In so doing, we look to Hudson v. McMillian, 503 
U.S. 1 (1992), in which the Supreme Court concluded that 
proof of significant injury was not an independent 
requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive 
and wanton force. Following Hudson's focus on the force 
used, as opposed to the injury inflicted, we conclude that 
although the degree of injury is relevant for any Eighth 
Amendment analysis, there is no fixed minimum quantum 
of injury that a prisoner must prove that he suffered 
through objective or independent evidence in order to state 
a claim for wanton and excessive force. 
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I. 
 
In May, 1994, Brooks was confined at the State 
Correctional Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania (SCI- 
Camp Hill). Defendants, Superintendent Kenneth Kyler, 
Sergeant Russell Porterfield, Correctional Officer Michael 
Rupinski, and Correctional Officer Gerald Devlin were 
assigned to SCI-Camp Hill during the time in question.1 
Brooks contends that on the evening of May 5, 1994, 
Officers Devlin and Rupinski and Sergeant Porterfield 
physically assaulted him while he was attempting to 
complete an authorized phone call. The facts adduced by 
Brooks in opposition to the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment are as follows. 
 
According to Brooks, before the assault took place, Devlin 
and Rupinski came to his cell in the isolation confinement 
unit and told him that he had been approved for a legal 
phone call. They then handcuffed him to a waist restraint 
belt and conducted a pat down search. After being escorted 
to another cell, Brooks placed his call. Approximately ten 
minutes later, Devlin told Brooks to terminate his 
conversation. Brooks maintains that he acknowledged the 
directive but that less than a minute after Devlin issued his 
order, and while he was in the process of hanging up, 
Sergeant Porterfield pushed Devlin aside, ran into the cell, 
and pushed down the telephone receiver. 
 
When Brooks turned and asked Devlin what was 
happening, Porterfield is said to have struck the right side 
of Brooks's head with his fist, and then to have continued 
with more punches. Brooks, still handcuffed to the waist 
restraint belt, fell face down as Porterfield allegedly 
continued to punch him in the head while Devlin and 
Rupinski stomped on his back and neck. As Porterfield 
continued punching him in the back of the head, Brooks 
represents that he went "unconscious semi-conscious," and 
that several minutes later, Rupinski placed him in leg 
shackles. According to Brooks, he was then raised about 
four feet from the floor by the leg shackles' chains and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although Devlin's name does not appear in the caption, he was a 
defendant in the District Court, and summary judgment was granted in 
his favor. 
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waist restraint belt, and slammed into a cell wall. At that 
point, Porterfield allegedly began choking Brooks with both 
hands, nearly rendering Brooks unconscious. As he was 
choking Brooks, Porterfield is said to have threatened to kill 
Brooks and to have told him that "no one will ever find 
out." Finally, Brooks alleges that, after the attack, the 
officers transported him back to his cell where he was 
subjected to further physical and verbal abuse prior to 
being unshackled. 
 
As a result of the alleged attack, Brooks suffered injuries 
including abrasions (or "scratches" as the defendants call 
them) on his neck and hands. When the assault ended, 
Brooks requested to see the shift commander and to receive 
medical treatment. A nurse arrived five minutes later and 
gave Brooks his daily medication for a previously diagnosed 
condition of high blood pressure. The officer accompanying 
the nurse told Brooks to file a grievance. Brooks claims that 
shortly thereafter he, as well as other inmates, saw Devlin, 
Rupinski and Porterfield congregating with a lieutenant in 
what appeared to be an attempt to cover up the assault. 
When the lieutenant passed Brooks's cell roughly thirty 
minutes later, Brooks told him what had happened. The 
lieutenant allegedly told Brooks that he did not believe him 
and walked away. When the shift changed, Brooks, upon 
his request, was examined and treated by a physician and, 
the following day, received various pain medications. 
Brooks maintains that his blood pressure remained very 
high for two to three weeks after the alleged assault.2 
Brooks also alleges that he was given medication for 
anxiety, stress, and depression as a result of being attacked.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Defendants have submitted the declaration of SCI-Huntingdon Medical 
Records Technician Sharon Wolfe to the effect that Brooks's institutional 
medical records show that: Brooks's blood pressure was not checked on 
the date of the incident contrary to Brooks's allegations; Brooks had a 
history of high blood pressure; and Brooks was prescribed Vistaril on 
March 29, 1994, prior to the events at issue. See Appellees' Appendix at 
SA-69, PP 11-14. Given summary judgment posture, we construe this 
disputed fact in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 
3. Brooks apparently contacted Superintendent Kyler and filed a 
grievance. Two in-house investigations were conducted and Brooks was 
cited for misconduct against Porterfield and for failing to obey an order. 
After a hearing, Brooks was found guilty of both charges and was 
sanctioned to 140 days in solitary confinement. 
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Based on the described events, Brooks commenced this 
pro se action claiming, among other things, that the 
defendants' actions violated the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against the use of excessive force. 4 The 
defendants filed an answer denying the allegations of the 
complaint and, after discovery, moved for summary 
judgment. Brooks responded to the motion by submitting 
an affidavit setting forth his version of the events and 
arguing that he had been provided with inadequate 
discovery. The District Court found that Brooks's claims of 
being violently beaten by three correctional officers were 
unsupported by the medical evidence: 
 
       Although there are material facts in dispute regarding 
       the underlying cause and events at issue, it is 
       apparent that the type of vicious, prolonged attack 
       alleged by Brooks would have resulted in far greater 
       injuries than those which he indisputably sustained. 
 
Accordingly, the Court entered an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants. Brooks now appeals. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Brooks also alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent 
to 
 
his medical needs, that his due process rights were violated, that his 
request to file criminal charges against correctional officers was 
improperly denied, and that he was provided insufficient discovery. We 
agree with the District Court that Brooks cannot survive summary 
judgment as to these claims. Although a deliberate failure to provide 
medical treatment motivated by non-medical factors can present a 
constitutional claim, see Durmer v. O'Carroll , 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 
1993), in this case, it is uncontroverted that a nurse passing out 
medications looked at Brooks's injuries within minutes of the alleged 
beating, and that Brooks was treated by prison medical staff on the 
same day. Moreover, he presented no evidence of any harm resulting 
from a delay in medical treatment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 
9 (1992) ("Because society does not expect that prisoners will have 
unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical 
needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs 
are serious."). There was no evidence that the officers who did not 
immediately grant his request for a doctor thought that Brooks needed 
immediate medical treatment, or that the temporary denial "expose[d] the 
inmate `to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.' " 
Monmouth Cty. Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 
326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). 
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SS 1331, 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. We set forth the familiar standard of review in the 
margin.5 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
After conviction, the Eighth Amendment serves as the 
primary source of substantive protection in cases where an 
inmate challenges a prison official's use of force as 
excessive and unjustified. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312, 327 (1986). In an excessive force claim, the central 
question is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort 
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 
1, 7 (1992). Summary judgment in favor of a defendant is 
not appropriate if "it appears that the evidence, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a 
reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain." 
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322; see also Sampley v. Ruettgers, 
704 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
wantonness exists when a prison guard intends to harm an 
inmate). 
 
In determining whether a correctional officer has used 
excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, 
courts look to several factors including: (1) "the need for the 
application of force"; (2) "the relationship between the need 
and the amount of force that was used"; (3) "the extent of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We exercise plenary review over a District Court's grant of summary 
judgment and review the facts in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom summary judgment was entered. See Coolspring Stone 
Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 
1993). Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. See F.R.C.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the 
evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
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injury inflicted"; (4) "the extent of the threat to the safety of 
staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible 
officials on the basis of the facts known to them"; and (5) 
"any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 
response." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (citations omitted). 
 
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the 
defendants maintain that they employed only the minimal 
force necessary to protect their safety and institutional 
security, as we describe in the margin.6  They also rely on 
two internal investigations which concluded that Brooks's 
claims of excessive force were unfounded. See Appellees' 
Appendix at SA-88-9, PP 4-7. On this evidence, the 
defendants assert that they are entitled to summary 
judgment. While these considerations support the 
defendants' position, and might well lead to the defendants' 
verdict at trial, they are controverted by facts adduced by 
Brooks. If Brooks is believed, while the application of some 
force may have been needed to reign in Brooks's apparently 
overtime telephone call, he was shackled at the time so that 
the extent of his threat to staff would not have been great. 
 
What the appeal turns on then, under the Whitley 
factors, is the defendants' third argument that the medical 
evidence in the record does not support Brooks's allegation 
that he was violently beaten. They contend that Brooks's 
visible injuries, which include a few scratches to his neck 
and wrists, were de minimis and create a presumption that 
the force used against him was inadequate to state an 
Eighth Amendment claim: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In his declaration, Porterfield states that after Brooks ignored three 
orders to hang up the telephone, Porterfield entered the cell and 
terminated the conversation. See Appellees' Appendix at SA-59-60, PP 3- 
9. Thereafter, Porterfield contends, Brooks threw the phone against the 
wall, spun around, and grabbed Porterfield's shirt. See id. at P 10. With 
the assistance of Devlin and Rupinski, Porterfield states that he then 
restrained Brooks and shackled Brooks's legs. See id. at P 11. Finally, 
Porterfield denies each of Brooks's allegations of verbal and physical 
abuse, adding that Brooks remained conscious throughout the entire 
incident and was issued a misconduct for assault and refusing to obey 
an order. See id. at PP 16-26. Devlin and Rupinski also deny Brooks's 
allegations of excessive physical abuse and substantiate the version of 
events Porterfield set forth in his sworn declaration. 
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       [T]he undisputed medical evidence shows that the only 
       injuries which Brooks had were a few scratches to his 
       neck and hands. Even assuming that the corrections 
       officials were not justified in using force against 
       Brooks, he has failed to present any medical evidence 
       which would demonstrate that he sustained anything 
       more than de minimis injuries. 
 
(Brief of Appellees, p. 20). 
 
B. 
 
The Supreme Court case most on point is Hudson v. 
McMillian. In Hudson, an inmate sued after an alleged 
assault in which he suffered minor bruises and swelling of 
his face, mouth, and lip, as well as a cracked dental plate. 
See 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992). The defendants in that case 
argued that these injuries were "minor" and therefore could 
not be redressed through an Eighth Amendment suit, but 
the Court insisted that "[t]he dissent's theory that . . . an 
inmate who alleges excessive use of force [must] show 
serious injury in addition to the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain misapplies Wilson and ignores the body of 
our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 10. Therefore, 
Hudson primarily stands for the proposition that a showing 
of "significant" or "serious" injury is not necessary to make 
an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 8. 
 
Hudson dictates that we must assess the degree of force 
employed in relation to the apparent need for it. In 
discussing this balance the Court used language indicating 
that de minimis force may, in extreme instances, violate the 
Eighth Amendment. The statement in Hudson that there is 
no constitutional violation for "de minimis uses of physical 
force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort 
repugnant to the conscience of mankind," id. at 9-10 
(citations omitted), counsels that, where the force is 
"repugnant to the conscience of mankind," even a de 
minimis use of force could be constitutionally significant. 
 
We need not now resolve whether de minimis force would 
support a constitutional claim in this case, however, 
because Brooks's allegations rise far above the de minimis 
level. Three correctional officers allegedly assaulted Brooks 
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by repeatedly punching him in the head, stomping on his 
back and neck, slamming him into a wall, choking him, 
threatening him, and nearly rendering him unconscious -- 
all while he was handcuffed to a waist restraint belt and, at 
some points, even restrained by leg shackles -- simply 
because he did not promptly respond to an order to end a 
phone call. If a jury believes Brooks's version of the facts, 
there is no question that the defendants' use of force was 
excessive in light of the circumstances confronting them. 
 
C. 
 
The defendants claim that Brooks' evidence does not 
support his claim, and that we cannot rely on his 
declarations because there is a requirement of objective or 
independent proof of something more than de minimis 
injury in order to state this kind of Eighth Amendment 
claim. The absence of medical evidence supporting Brooks's 
allegations of being violently beaten is conclusive proof, 
they submit, that the force used was de minimis by 
constitutional standards. In granting summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants, the District Court endorsed this 
view. The Court's conclusion finds support in an opinion of 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which decided 
in a similar case (but with less egregious allegations) that 
evidence of only de minimis injury provided"conclusive 
evidence" that only de minimis force was used. Norman v. 
Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Focusing on 
the following passage in Hudson: 
 
       The blows directed at Hudson . . . are not de minimis 
       for Eighth Amendment purposes. The extent of 
       Hudson's injuries thus provides no basis for dismissal 
       . . . . 
 
Id. at 1262 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10), the Norman 
court concluded that the conjunction of these sentences 
negatively implied that certain injuries could be so 
insignificant as to warrant dismissal. 
 
We disagree. Although the Norman reading is plausible, 
drawing instruction from Supreme Court passages through 
the use of the negative pregnant is risky and 
unsatisfactory. We find the better reading of these 
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sentences to be the more straightforward one, drawn from 
the general teaching of Hudson: i.e., the absence of 
significant resulting injury is not a per se reason for 
dismissing a claim based on alleged wanton and 
unnecessary use of force against a prisoner. Although the 
extent of an injury provides a means of assessing the 
legitimacy and scope of the force, the focus always remains 
on the force used (the blows). "[T]he constitutional 
touchstone is whether punishment is cruel and unusual." 
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 
We acknowledge that Hudson itself leaves open the 
possibility that there is some minimum amount of injury 
required to make a wanton infliction of force claim. 
However, a thorough probe of the Hudson opinion indicates 
that the absence of proof of minor or significant injury 
should not mandate dismissal. As we read the opinion, the 
Supreme Court is committed to an Eighth Amendment 
which protects against cruel and unusual force, not merely 
cruel and unusual force that results in sufficient injury. In 
Hudson, the Court distinguished between prisoner 
conditions-of-confinement and medical-deprivation claims, 
on the one hand, and wanton use of unnecessary force 
claims on the other. Although the former kind of claim 
cannot survive without evidence that a deprivation was 
"harmful enough" (because contemporary standards of 
decency do not require that the government give succor to 
the medical and maintenance needs of inmates), the latter 
kind of claim has no such requirement: 
 
       When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use 
       force to cause harm, contemporary standards of 
       decency always are violated. This is true whether or 
       not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth 
       Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no 
       matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than 
       some arbitrary quantity of injury. 
 
Id. at 9. 
 
Requiring objective or independent proof of minor or 
significant injury, would ignore this teaching and place 
protection from injury, instead of protection from wanton 
force, at the hub of the Eighth Amendment. See Moore v. 
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Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1993) ("No actual injury 
needs to be proven to state a viable Eighth Amendment 
claim."). But see Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 924 
(5th Cir. 1999) ("[T]o support an Eighth Amendment 
excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from 
the excessive force a more than de minimis physical 
injury."). This is not to say, as the Hudson court observed, 
that the degree of resulting injury is not highly relevant to 
the determination of the unreasonableness of the force 
used; rather, it merely says that the absence of objective 
proof of non-de minimis injury does not alone warrant 
dismissal. If we were to adopt the District Court's 
reasoning, a prisoner could constitutionally be attacked for 
the sole purpose of causing pain as long as the blows were 
inflicted in a manner that resulted in visible (or palpable or 
diagnosable) injuries that were de minimis. 7 
 
D. 
 
In sum, in light of Hudson, the District Court's ruling 
cannot stand. The defendants' acts are not shielded from 
constitutional scrutiny simply because Brooks did not 
proffer objective evidence of more than de minimis injuries. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In his concurring opinion in Hudson, Justice Blackmun observed that 
requiring significant (i.e., externally observable) injury would not 
 
       constrain prison officials from lashing prisoners with leather 
straps, 
       whipping them with rubber hoses, beating them with naked fists, 
       shocking them with electric currents, asphyxiating them short of 
       death, intentionally exposing them to undue heat or cold, or 
forcibly 
       injecting them with psychosis-inducing drugs. 
 
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 14 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 
We note in this regard that Brooks cannot seek independent medical 
advice from a specialist or his personal physician to corroborate his 
allegations regarding his injuries (or that he suffered from high blood 
pressure as a result of the attack, see supra n.2). Therefore, when courts 
do focus on the injury, it is important that they recognize that "an 
inmate who is proceeding pro se, is in a decidedly difficult position from 
which to generate `record evidence' on his behalf. . . [u]nder these 
circumstances, his affidavits . . . are about the best that can be 
expected 
 
from him [at the summary judgment phase of] the proceedings." Norman 
v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1265 (4th Cir. 1994) (Hall, J., dissenting). 
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We have, throughout the opinion, used the language of de 
minimis, minor, and significant injury as if there were such 
categories, because the problem presented to us by the 
District Court, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Norman, and 
the defendants, required us to respond to their effort to 
make such delineations. However, we do not deem these 
differences constitutionally significant; rather, an essential 
aspect of our holding is that a plaintiff 's claim does not 
turn on these definitions. 
 
Therefore, our opinion should not be read to conclude 
that the superficial lacerations and abrasions that Brooks 
indisputably suffered were de minimis or minor. Regardless 
of the category of the injury, Brooks adduced evidence of 
the use of wanton, unnecessary force resulting in severe 
pain. This creates a disputed issue of material fact for the 
trier of fact to resolve. Accepting Brooks's allegations as 
true, as we must, a jury could find that the defendants 
acted not merely in good faith to maintain or restore 
discipline, but rather out of malice for the very purpose of 
causing harm. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. On this record, 
we cannot say as a matter of law, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to Brooks, that excessive force was not 
used. Accordingly, it was improper to grant summary 
judgment on this claim. 
 
We will reverse the District Court's judgment with respect 
to the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. In all other respects, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
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